Off the Shelves 6

From philosophers of the past, we turn to one from the present, Professor Peter Kreeft.

Peter Kreeft is a convert from Calvinism, professor of philosophy at Boston College, author of more than 45 books and one of the best known Catholic apologists today. He has also been an influential figure among younger Catholics with his ability to present and refute relativism, secularism and scepticism in an engaging and entertaining style, calling to mind another great apologist, GK Chesterton. In A Refutation of Moral Relativism (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999) Kreeft uses a dialogue between Isa, a "Muslim fundamentalist" absolutist, and Libby, a "Black feminist" reporter to decide if there are any moral absolutes in the world. The following extract is from chapter 2.

Libby: So can you define relativism for us, Professor?
Isa: Yes. Relativisim is the philosophy that denies absolutes. Any absolutes. Everyone believes there are many relativities, that some things are relative; but relativism claims that all things are relative.
Libby: That seems very clear.
Isa: Except that there a different kinds of relativism. I cna think of at least four important kinds that we have to distinguish: metaphysical relativism, epistemological relativism, moral relativism, and religious relativism. You can claim there are no absolutes anywhere in reality- that's metaphysical relativism. Or anywhere in human knowledge- that's epistemological relativism. Or anywhere in morality- that's moral relativism. Or anywhere in religion- that's religious relativism.
Libby: So is religious relativism the same as atheisim?
Isa: No. Metaphysical relativism is the same as atheism (assuming "God" means the "Absolute Being"). Metaphysics is about being. Religion is about relationships with the Absolute Being. So religious relativism says there's no absolute religion, no absolutely best or truests religious relationship with God. Atheism says there's no God, no Absolute Being, no absolute anywhere in reality.
Libby: What's epistemological relativism?
Isa: It says, "Perhaps there is a metaphysical absolute, an Absolute Being, somewhere; but it can't be known. There's no absolute in human knowledge.
Libby: So epistemological relativism means scepticism.
Isa: Scepticism about the Absolute, at least, or agnosticism. Or it could be total scepticism, scepticism about all reality.
Libby: And now where does moral relativism fit in?
Isa: Well, metaphysical relativism says, "No absolute in reality", and epistemologicla relativism says, "Perhaps in reality but not in knowledge", and then moral relativism says, "Perhaps there are absolutes in nonmoral knowledge, like 'two plus two makes four', but not in moral knowledge: we know no moral absolutes. And then, finally, religious relativism says, "Perhaps in moral knowledge but no in religious knowledge. Perhaps love, or the Golden Rule, or justice can be known to be absolute, but no religion can."
Libby: And why do we need to define these three relativisms to talk about moral relativism?
Isa: So we can distinguish it from them and confine ourselves to it.
Libby: All right. So now let's focus more exactly on what you mean by moral relativism and moral absolutism.
Isa: We need to define the two words moral and absolute. Let's take moral first. How do we use the word? It's used to refer to a quality of people and their deeds, interior and exterior, hat we express by the words good and bad, or good and evil. But not all good is moral good: a good car, for instance. So more specifically, moral good and bad means right and wrong. Even there, we have to be more specific, since something can be "right" without being morally right: the right answer to a puzzle, for instance. So let's say morality is about what we ought to do and ought not to do. Another word for ought is n imperative, or an obligation. I think everyone understand what moral mens, from ordinary language usage, so I'd rather not go any deeper into questions philosophers have about defing that term now. I'd like to stick to ordinary language and talk to ordinary people.
Libby: That you, Professor Extraordinaire. And now what about defining absolutism and relativism?
Isa: As I said, relativism says there are no absolutes. Absolutely no absolutes. Absolutism says there are some absolutes. At least one absolute. Absolutism is relatively absolutistic, and relativism is absolutely relativistic.
Libby: Ah, we're going to refute relativism by a brilliant word juggling trick, I see.
Isa: No, we're not. We're going to give ordinary language meanings, that's all.
Libby: Then what does relative mean, and what does absolute mean?
Isa: Relative is always "relative to something else", contingent upon something else, conditional upon something else. Absolute means "not relative", not contingent but necessary, not conditioned but unconditioned. No ifs, ands, or buts.
Libby: Could you give eaxmples?
Isa: Certainly. "Don't steal if it hurts anybody" is a relative moral imperative. "Don't steal, period" is an absolute one.
Libby: What Kant called a "Categorical Imperative".
Isa: Yes. But "Be good to others if and when you want them to be good to you" is not a moral absolute. "Be good to others always" is.
Libby: So absolutes are unchangeable.
Isa: Yes, and universal, and objective. Those are the three characteristics that distinguish an absolute. It is not relative to time, so it doesn't change. And it's not relative to place or nation or class or culture or race or gender or any group - it's universal. Third, it's not relative to opinion or thought or belief o desire or feeling or any subjective consciousness. It's objectively real, objectively true, whether I or you or anyone else knows it, or believes it, or likes it, or cares bout it, or obeys it.
Libby: So personal opinions and beliefs and feelings and motivations and intentions- they don't change morality.
Isa: No ...
Libby: So intentions aren't important, only the rules?
Isa: No, that's not right. Some moral rules are about intentions. Others are about external deeds. For instance, "don't be greedy" is about intentions, and "don't steal" is about deeds. But both are absolute. Greed and theft are both wrong- always wrong, for everyone. No exceptions.
Libby: So a good intention doesn't make a deed good?
Isa: It doesn't make a bad deed good.
Libby: So love isn't enough? A sincere, loving intention isn't enough? Is that what you're saying?
Isa: That's what I am saying. If I kill you because I'm sincerely trying to help the poor but killing the rich, that's still a bad deed.
Libby: So only deeds count, not intentions?
Isa: No, both count. You need good deeds and good intentions. Neither one can substitute for the other. A good deed doesn't change a bad intention into a good one, so a good intention doesn't change a bad deed into a good one either.
Libby: And what about situations? Changing situations don't change morality either, according to your absolutism?
Isa: No, they change how you should apply the rules, but they don't change the rules.
Libby: So its just as wrong for Jean Valjean in Les Miserables to steal a loaf of bread to feed his starving family as it is for Blackbeard the Pirate to steal the King's gold to make himself rich? Is that what you're saying?
Isa: No, I say Jean Valjean did not steal at all. He had a right to that food. Blackbeard had no right to the gold.
Libby: I see. So the situation doesn't ever change stealing from wrong to right, but it sometimes changes taking from stealing to not stealing.
Isa: Very well put, Libby.
Libby: I'm not your student, Professor, I'm your interviewer.
Isa: Oh. Sorry.
Libby: Let's be sure I understand this. You're a moral absolutist, but you'd say it was morally right for a Dutch family who were hiding Jews from the Nazis to lie to the Nazis when they came to search the house, right? I mean yu'd say that wasn't lying at all, because the Nazis had no right to know. Is that right?
Isa: Yes. The Nazis had no right to know that truth, and the Jews had a right to conceal it, and the Dutch had a right to deceive the Nazis about it- an obligation, even. So it wasn't wrong. Lying is always wrong, and that wasn't wrong, so that wasn't a lie, just as Jean Valjean stealing the bread wasn't a theft. So the absolutes remain: never lie, never steal.